

THE TERRORISM THREAT TO JAPAN: REAL DANGER OR COSTLY OVERESTIMATION

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Abstract: This paper aims to estimate the reality and degree of the terrorist threat to the state of Japan and its citizens. The main focus has been placed on issues connected with the Islamic State and actions of the Shinzo Abe government towards the issue over the last two years. The current policy of Japan towards terrorism will be reviewed and the potential implications of those actions will be shown. The connection between anti-terrorism policy and the national security of Japan will also be examined. This paper will conclude with a prognosis about the potential development of the issue and probable possibilities to counter said threat.

Key words: terrorism, Islamic State, Japan, Japanese constitution

This year has been shocking for Japanese politicians and citizens. The brutal decapitations of two Japanese citizens, Kenji Goto and Haruna Yukawa by the Islamic State has raised many questions about the efficiency of Tokyo's current anti-terrorist policy. Meanwhile, a series of attacks that struck various states around the globe has also put in doubt the relative safety from terrorism that Japanese citizens have enjoyed for more than two decades. Especially damaging to morale was the attack in Australia, which proved that even remote states considered safe and far away from the centre of struggle cannot feel safe from jihadist threat.

The main purpose of this paper is to measure the seriousness of the terrorist threat to Japan really is. In the first part of the paper I intend to identify the sources of possible terrorist threats to Japan and its citizens travelling abroad. The concern of the second part of the paper is the current policy of the Japanese government on this issue, to review it and propose possible improvements. Although the nature of terrorism holds a large amount of uncertainty, I believe this paper will help to reduce it and offer solutions appropriate to the level of the terrorism threat to Japan.

HOW TERRORISTS THREATEN JAPAN AND ITS CITIZENS

As stated above, measuring the threat of terrorism¹ is not an easy task. Because it is obviously connected with the organizations somehow unwilling to provide us with details about their future actions, if we are to predict the outcome of possible decisions, we need to rely largely on deduction and previous experience. This case is no exception. Therefore, to find the basis for the potential terrorist threat for Japan, the analysis of historical data will be used.

Table 1: Terrorist attacks that affected Japanese citizens through after II world war

Year of an attack	The Place	Group	Number of victims with Japanese citizenship	Total number of casualties	Were Japanese main target
1972	Japan, Karuizawa	Japanese Red Army	17*, 1 ^p	17	Yes
1995	Japan, Tokyo	Aum Shinrikyo	12	12	Yes
1996	Peru, Lima	Tupac Amaru	4 ^p	1	No
1997	Egypt, Luxor	Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya	2	54	No
1999	Kirgizstan	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan	4 ^p	7 ^p	No
2001	USA, New York	Al-Qaida	24	2973	No
2002	Indonesia, Bali	Jemaah Islamiyah	2	202	No
2002	Pakistan, Karachi	? Al-Qaida and al-Qanin	1 ^r	11	No
2003	Iraq, Tikrit	?	2	3	Yes
2004	Iraq, Al-Fallujah	Saraya-Al-Mujahedeen	3 ^p	0	No
2004	Iraq	Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn	1	1	Yes
2003	Saudi Arabia, Al-Rijad	Al-Qaida	few ^r	34	No
2003	Israel, Jerusalem	Hamas	2 ^r	9	No
2005	Iraq, Hit	Jadish Ansar a-Sunna	1	18	No
2005	Indonesia, Bali	Jemaah Islamiyah	1	20	No
2013	Algeria, Ajn Amnas	The al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam Brigade	10	39	No
2015	Syria	Islamic State	2	2	Yes
2015	Tunisia, Tunis	Okba Ibn Nafaa (IS related)	3	22	No

* – 14 of 17 casualties of Asama – Sansou attack were members of Japanese Red Army, who were killed as a result of internal fraction

Xr – wounded

Xp –kidnapped and released alive

¹ Defined here, as 'the deliberate use or the threat to use violence against civilians in order to attain political, ideological and religious aims' [B. Gannor, *DEFINING TERRORISM: IS ONE MAN'S TERRORIST ANOTHER MAN'S FREEDOM FIGHTER?*, in: „Police Practice and Research”, 2002, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 287–304.

Four main conclusions emerge from this data:

1. The majority of terrorist acts that have affected Japanese citizens (including all that happened in the last 20 years) have been orchestrated by Islamic terrorist organizations.
2. The majority of terrorist acts that have affected Japanese citizens (including all that happened in the last 20 years) occurred outside the territory of Japan.
3. The number of actions taken directly against Japanese citizens is lower than the number of attacks against the 'western civilization' as a whole in which Japanese citizens were victims.
4. After 1995, attacks not targeting Japanese citizens directly led to many more deaths, than those intended to affect the policy of Tokyo directly.

Those four points do not obviously exhaust the subject. Rather, we should simply treat them as an introduction to deeper analysis. As for point one, it should be noticed that the dominance of Islamic terrorism is a global trend and not simply the effect of the internal situation in Japan. What is more, this does not mean that attacks from other sources will not happen. Terrorist actions from internal political or ideological factions seem unlikely, even more after the disbanding of long-inactive Japanese Red Army, as the state itself seems to be relatively stable on this matter. Aon Risk Solutions rates the threat of those actions as marginal.² Yet, as the case of Utoya Isle in Norway brutally proves, we cannot completely rule out actions of so called 'lone wolves'³ even in the states that seem the most healthy. Other potential sources of terrorist attack are connected with international issues in relations between Japan and China and South Korea. The most visible proof of tension between those states would be Senkaku/Diaoyu and Dokdo/Matsushima disputes, but we have to remember that the real conflict lies between the societies of those states and has its roots deeply in the history. However, though these issues may be the cause of potential terrorist actions, **there is currently no proof it would ever happen nor would even be planned**. Thus, the remaining part this article will focus mostly on proven danger in the presence of Islamic terrorism.

The second point is strongly connected with the first. While reviewing the data about terrorist attacks affecting Japanese citizens, we can clearly see the evolution from actions taken on Japanese territory, itself, to actions taken outside of it. The reasons are closely connected with those already mentioned, i.e., the improvement in internal security extinguished the most dangerous social issues and sudden emergence of international Islamic terrorism.

The third point shows that the lives of Japanese citizens are strongly connected with the global security system. We can clearly see that most terrorist attacks were not directed Japanese citizens, themselves. More than that, attacks

² *2015 Terrorism and Political Violence Risk Map – a guide*, Aon Risk Solutions, <http://www.aon.com/terrorismmap/2015-guide-terrorism-political-violence-risk-map.pdf> (accessed in June 2014).

³ Defined here as 'Terrorists, who plan and act alone'.

directly targeting Japanese citizens had been committed almost exclusively by a single terrorist ‘root,’ coming from the former Al-Qaida of Iraq at the command of deceased Abu Mosab al-Zarqawi. Like this organisation, the Islamic State has adopted tactics of kidnappings to attain political goals as well as brutal treatment of victims. Kidnapping and threatening to execute prisoners was in fact used against Japanese citizens during both the Second Gulf War and the current struggle in Syria and Iraq. In the first case the goal of terrorists was to force withdrawal of Japanese peacekeeping personnel from Iraq, in the second – to stop Japanese financial support for the anti-IS coalition from Japanese financial support. In both cases the threat failed and prisoners were executed.

As the first conclusion above was connected with the second, the third remains linked with the fourth. Not only were there more indirect than direct attacks targeting Japanese citizens, the results of former were more bloody. There seem to be several reasons for this connection. First of all, Japan is probably not perceived as a major priority target for Sunni terrorist groups. As we can see on a map posted on twitter by members of the so-called ‘IS Caliphate,’ its aims for now in the East extend only as far as for Pakistan and parts of India and China.



IS Caliphate minimum plan map Source: Islamic State Media twitter account, currently disabled (accessed in April 2014)

Japan does not have a large Muslim community that could be perceived as being treated unjustly or could serve as a foundation for jihadist recruitment. Meanwhile, as Japan is also one of the most developed states, it is not surprising its citizens are present in various other places, especially tourist attractions, making them potential targets for terrorist actions.

The most logical conclusion from these points would be that **while Japan is relatively safe from terrorist threat, its citizens are not**. Is that statement true? At this point probably yes. May it change in the future? In my opinion, it is likely to happen.

WHY IS JAPAN IN DANGER

As stated previously, terrorist attacks in Japan are currently very unlikely. The political system seems to be stable and there are no internal social issues that could possibly provoke an action of this kind. Could we see a sudden erosion of political and social stability in Japan? There are no signs currently, but we cannot exclude that. What we can and should take notice of are the results of IS jihadist actions in Syria and Iraq. And special focus should be placed on the foreign fighters in the Southeast Asia and South Asia regions – a growing source of labour for an ageing Japanese society. As for 2011 it was estimated that almost 92,000 Muslims currently live in Japan, most of them of Indonesian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi origin.⁴ There are also some Muslims in the Japanese-Filipino community, but the number is hard to estimate. The total number of Filipino immigrants in Japan was estimated to be as high as 210 000 in 2010.⁵ While current Muslim communities in Japan are not likely to cause problems, this might not be as true for future immigrants, especially those from post-IS era.

Table 2: Foreign Fighters from the East Asia region in Iraq and Syria

State	Estimated number of foreign fighters engaged in activities in Iraq and Syria
Australia	100–2501
China	300
Philippines	?2
Indonesia	500+3
Malaysia	100+
New Zeland	6
Singapore	2+

As we can see, the number of foreign fighters from East Asia currently fighting for jihadist movements in the Middle East region is noticeable. Real numbers might be even larger as many future IS recruits do not leave enough tracks to identify the true reason for their departure from their home states. And that is just

⁴ H. Tanada. *Sekai to Nihon Masurimu Jinko 2011 Nen*, in: „Ningen Kagaku Kenkyuu 26”, p. 29–39 (2013), Tokyo 2013.

⁵ Ministry of Justice, *Hensei 23 Nenmatsu Genzai ni Okeru Gaikokujin Tourokusha Kazu ni tsuite (Sokuhouchi)*, 22.02.2012, http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyuukokukanri04_00015.html (accessed in June 2015).

⁶ 1 Peter R. Neuman, *Foreign fighter total in Syria/Iraq now exceeds 20,000; surpasses Afghanistan conflict in the 1980s*, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, <http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/> (accessed in June 2015).

⁷ Philippines government is examining currently the leads about Islamic State possible recruitment of that state citizens.

⁸ J. Emont, *The Islamic State Comes to Indonesia*, „The Foreign Policy”, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/17/the-islamic-state-comes-to-indonesia/> (accessed in June 2015)

the beginning of this issue. Apart from those who leave their homes to participate in building the ‘caliphate’ in the Middle East, we can also observe cases of creating IS branches in different states across the globe. This usually takes the form of swearing the oath of loyalty to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, now also known as Caliph Ibrahim, by already existing extremist groups. This is similar to what we have observed after the 9/11 attacks, when local warlords and terrorist leaders wished to bask in the glory of al Qaeda, the organisation led by Bin Laden. In Southeast Asia there are at least several examples, for example, the oaths sworn by the Indonesian group Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid⁹, which is said to contain at least 3000 members, and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters joined by Abu Sayyaf.¹⁰ Both of those groups are located in Philippines, which is even more intimidating when we take into consideration the number of immigrants of Filipino origin living in Japan. Although these groups have not yet increased their activity on a large scale, this is likely to happen in the future. As Ahmed S. Hashim stated¹¹, the predicted increase of terrorist activity in the region is connected to foreign jihadists in Syria and Iraq returning to their home states. There are at least three types of problems that these individuals might cause: the first – the militants may create new organisations based on their experience with the Islamic State; the second – they would be influential for an already existing extremist group, which may lead to its further radicalisation and brutalisation, and third – former jihadists may be striving for vengeance against the states that actively opposed IS. Needless to say, Japan belongs to that group.

WHAT MEASURES SHOULD JAPAN TAKE?

The threat of terrorism in Japan is not as slight as it would seem at first sight. What means should Japan take to reduce the possible danger?

As mentioned previously, the most probable threat to citizens of Japan comes from the outside. Therefore the most logical conclusion would be **to use measures related to border control**, especially at airports. Another step that should be taken immediately is the **cooperation with foreign intelligence networks**. Apart from obvious choice of the CIA and other US agencies, the focus should be placed on states threatened by terrorism that are expected to provide large numbers of future immigrants to Japan. Indonesia, the Philippines and, perhaps, Malaysia would be the most suitable partners.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ A. S Hashim, The Impact of Islamic State in Asia, http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/PR150211_The_Impact_of_the_Islamic_State_in_Asia.pdf (accessed in June 2015).

¹¹ “The Daily Star Lebanon”, *Philippine militants pledge allegiance to ISIS*, 15 August 2014, <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2014/Aug-15/267358-philippine-militants-pledge-allegiance-to-isis.ashx> (accessed in June 2015).

Another interesting possibility, which could emerge from fruitful intelligence cooperation programs, is to **provide returning jihadists with ‘de-radicalisation’ programmes**. Albeit the idea itself is controversial, it might provide us with satisfying results in the case of the Islamic State. What many tend to forget is that IS is not just another terrorist or guerrilla group. As a result of proclaiming a caliphate, the Iraq and Syria fighters have gained much fame and recognition in their own lands as well as abroad. Despite the large number of benefits this has provided, it has made the group less flexible, something often crucial for the long term survival existence of extremist groups. The Caliphate is in its essence a form of state¹² that cannot exist without territory. Therefore should IS eventually fall, it is not able to go underground anymore. De-radicalisation programs could try to **convince returning fighters that IS fell because ‘Allah judged it as unrightfully’ and its methods are ‘evil’**. Should such programs be enforced by religious authorities and not the states, themselves, they might not only increase security in the region but also allow former fighters to lead peaceful lives and even turn the tide of Muslim extremism towards more peaceful approaches.

As was shown, Japan is not a primary target for Islamic terrorist movements, although it may be a potential target due to its participation in both the war on terror and the anti-IS coalition. Therefore, although somewhat obvious, the question about the need for Tokyo’s involvement should be asked. Would Japan benefit from the leaving anti-terrorist coalition? This is doubtful. Shinzo Abe’s decision to support the anti-IS coalition with \$50 million¹³ was not a mere reaction to the crisis, but a logical continuation of Japan taking a role as promotor of peace.¹⁴ This is also a proof of Japan’s reliability as an ally of US. With tensions growing in the Northeast Asian region taken into account, Japan considers this alliance crucial for its safety. Finally, stepping back from actions against IS would put into question the real motives behind the recent reinterpretation of the Japanese constitution that allows deployment of Self-Defence Forces outside the borders of the state.¹⁵ This would surely add to tensions in Japan – China and Japan – South Korea relations.

It should also be mentioned that even the possible withdrawal of Japanese support for the anti-IS coalition would decrease the probability of attack on its territory and stop the kidnappings of Japanese citizens, it also affects negatively the safety of Japanese people to terrorist actions targeting western communities as a whole. The Japanese victims of the March 2015 IS-related attack on the Tunisia

¹² Encyclopedia Britannica Online, <http://www.britannica.com/place/Caliphate> (accessed in June 2015).

¹³ The Japan Times, Abe pledges \$50 million in humanitarian aid to stem Islamic State crisis, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/09/26/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-pledges-50-million-in-humanitarian-aid-to-stem-islamic-state-crisis/#.VZvuOvmqpBc> (accessed in June 2015).

¹⁴ National Security Strategy December 17, 2013, <http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf> (accessed in June 2015).

¹⁵ The Japan Times, *U.S. hails defense revamp* <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/07/02/national/politics-diplomacy/u-s-hails-defense-revamp/#.VZv13PmqpBc> (accessed in June 2015).

National Museum did not die because of Tokyo involvement in the anti-terrorist coalition, but just because they were in the gunman's line of sight. In fact, as it was already mentioned, the majority of terrorism casualties due to attacks of this kind. Therefore, **withdrawal of Japanese help, which would result in cutting anti-terrorist resources as well as create an outburst of enthusiasm after a perceived terrorist success, could result in even more attacks in which Japanese citizens may be affected by a backlash.**

We also cannot be sure if the eventual withdrawal of support would result in abandoning kidnappings of Japanese citizens by the Islamic State. Although the release of 47 Indian nurses in Mosul¹⁶ might point us in that direction, there are simply not enough cases¹⁷ to create a generalisation. More than that, historical evidence taken from the actions of Al-Qaida of Iraq, which was mentioned before as a 'spiritual inspiration' for IS actions, does not give us a clear pattern, either. The terrorists of that group both released and killed hostages, so most likely the fate of victims would be in hands of certain jihadist war band warlords.

Then perhaps Japan should expand its presence in the anti-ISIS coalition by deploying a military force against the Islamic State? The answer is not easy. This seems unnecessary at the current time. This could change if the international coalition opted to increase its presence in Iraq and Syria and deployed ground forces to deal with jihadists. Obviously, the decision to join this kind of operation would put Japan on the frontline of the war on terror, something not needed for Japan or its citizens. I would argue though that as a result of former decisions, **Japan would have no other choice if the US were to join the assault.** This conclusion results from the reinterpretation of the 'self-defence' clause, which allows Japan to send military forces abroad as long as an ally is in a state of war. Although the Prime Minister Abe clearly stated that this step was taken to counter the threat of terrorism, neighbouring states took it as a sign of Japanese remilitarisation. As a result, avoiding involvement in a probable military operation in the Middle East would be perceived by China, South Korea and Russian Federation as showing the true intentions of this reinterpretation.

SUMMARY

Although Japan may seem at first unconcerned by the terrorism issue and a state that has confronted no serious threat of this kind for the last twenty last years, terrorism remains in fact a serious problem for the Japanese government.

¹⁶ "Inquisitr". *ISIS Releases 46 Kidnapped Indian Nurses. Freed Nurses Say They Were Treated Well*, 4 August 2014, <http://www.inquisitr.com/1335092/isis-releases-46-kidnapped-indian-nurses-freed-nurses-say-they-were-treated-well/#1gpYLY6uC8pl5SC3.99> (accessed in June 2015).

¹⁷ By similar I mean involving citizens of the state not engaged in anti-IS coalition.

In reality, the only thing that has changed is the nature of the threat. In the second half of the twentieth century, Japan faced a danger at home connected with the leftist fighters of Japanese Red Army. Now, Japanese citizens are falling because of radical Muslim terrorism abroad that is growing bolder and more fearsome because of the recent advance of so-called 'Islamic State'. Tokyo has to face this threat. Taking a neutral stance could perhaps save some Japanese people who were to be kidnapped, but it would not save the lives of those affected by attacks like the one at the Tunisia National Museum. Non-involvement is also out of question because of the Japan-US alliance. As the security of Japan is strongly connected to bonds between these states, Tokyo has no interest in weakening it by not involving itself in this matter, which is also one of the most important issues for Washington. The reinterpretation of the term 'Self-Defence' in the Japanese constitution was another step to this direction. As it was solely because of the terrorism threat, not backing it up with actions could be taken by neighbouring nations as a step against them and thus ignite even more intense relations between the states of Northeast Asia.

It is to be expected that Japan might become a major target for terrorists as a result of its current and future actions. While Japan is still in a relatively good position, being located far from conflict centre, protected by its island location, and having a relatively small Muslim population, the danger of terrorist attack on Japan, itself, will most likely increase. This is strongly connected to the return of jihadist from Middle East region to their homelands in South and Southeast Asia – states that are sources of labour for the Japanese economy. Thus, it is expected that the government of Shinzo Abe will increase the protection of the isles – both by internal means and by cooperation with partners in the region. Would this provide the safety for the Japanese homeland? We cannot be too optimistic about it, as not every attack can be anticipated and intercepted. But if the right countermeasures are to be taken, the risk of large scale actions could fall drastically.

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ZAGROŻENIE TERRORYSTYCZNE JAPONII – RZECZYWISTE CZY KOSZTOWNA NADINTERPRETACJA

Streszczenie: Celem poniższej pracy jest ocena realności oraz stopnia zagrożenia terroryzmem dla państwa japońskiego. Główny nacisk został położony na problemy powiązane z działalnością Państwa Islamskiego jako zjawiska niejako definiującego postrzeganie przez nas całość problemu, jak i tego, które na przestrzeni ostatniego roku miało największy wpływ na działania rządu premiera Abe odnośnie terroryzmu. Rozpatrzona zostanie również obecna polityka władz Japonii, jak i jej potencjalne implikacje oraz osadzenie tego aspektu polityki w całości polityki bezpieczeństwa narodowego tego państwa. Przedstawione zostaną również prognozy dotyczące przewidywanej drogi rozwoju problemu oraz ewentualne możliwości jego przezwyciężenia.

Słowa kluczowe: terroryzm, Państwo Islamskie, Japonia, konstytucja Japonii