The Justification of Ethics Today
Abstract
Freedom is driven by cognition. One cognizes a good and can aim at it because this is a certain good; or one can reject it because this is a good. Choice among numerous goods is based on that. Action
can be only evil in itself if it does or allow harm without “appropriate reason.” The reason of an action is then inappropriate when an action/activity – in the long run and in the context of the entire
reality – diminishes the value it strives to reach. The damage ensued becomes then “the object” that one craves in action. If “the object” of an action is differentiated from “the reason”, then in essence
“the object” of the second action becomes the focal point, which in turn one aims to facilitate through the first action. The surrounding “circumstances” provide only quantitative reference with regard to
the extent in which a particular action is good or evil.
can be only evil in itself if it does or allow harm without “appropriate reason.” The reason of an action is then inappropriate when an action/activity – in the long run and in the context of the entire
reality – diminishes the value it strives to reach. The damage ensued becomes then “the object” that one craves in action. If “the object” of an action is differentiated from “the reason”, then in essence
“the object” of the second action becomes the focal point, which in turn one aims to facilitate through the first action. The surrounding “circumstances” provide only quantitative reference with regard to
the extent in which a particular action is good or evil.
Keywords
ethics; freedom;, „evil in essence”; over-exploitation; counter-productivity; fontes moralitatis (object; reason; circumstances); action; a relations of actions
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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/kw.2013.8.9
Date of publication: 2015-07-07 04:48:49
Date of submission: 2015-07-07 03:02:33
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Copyright (c) 2015 Peter Knauer SJ
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