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When the Interpretation Becomes the Doctrine. Constitutional Originalism in the United States
Abstract
Since the problem of the interpretation of the Constitution of the United States is multifaceted and touches the topics of philosophy, law and politics, it refers to universal issues studied by the discipline of political and legal doctrines. In this context the ideological (political) aspect of the interpretation is perhaps the most important, as interpretation necessarily involves adjudication in axiological choices. In this state of affairs, originalism, a theory specific to American jurisprudence, seems particularly interesting. It refers to the strict interpretation of the Constitution. It assumes that the historical understanding of the text or the legislator’s intentions established at the time when the relevant provisions were adopted bind the courts, especially the Supreme Court conducting the judicial review. This approach is intended to achieve neutral and ideological exegesis of the Constitution. It is a strong voice in the dispute over the value of law and for the separation of law and politics. However, simply refraining from a dynamic and creative interpretation of the Constitution can, and often involves law in politics. The decision to maintain a long-established interpretation petrifies the system and closes the constitutional catalog of rights and freedoms, while the idea of “faithfulness to the Constitution” sets the direction of the political agenda of other powers and influences the political imagination of the public. The originalist interpretation of the Constitution leads, i.a., to defense the right to gun ownership, the free market and federalism, and to oppose positive discrimination programs, universal health insurance obligations or the right to abortion. By adhering to the traditional understanding of regulations, it necessarily supports norms and values that are considered conservative today. Hence, originalism takes the form of judicial activism and resembles the political and legal doctrine, although due to its formal nature (it defends an established order regardless of its content), it is not a doctrine in the strict sense.
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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/g.2020.67.2.9-36
Date of publication: 2021-02-05 15:03:14
Date of submission: 2020-05-03 20:55:28
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